**Université de Toulouse le Mirail
Concours d'Entrée, Juin 2014
CETIM : Centre de Traduction, Interprétation et Médiation Linguistique**

Sujet Anglais

MASTER 1

Consignes :

1. Résumer le document en <u>français</u> à un tiers environ de sa longueur d'origine (230-250 mots).

2. En vous appuyant sur l'ensemble du document pour en déduire le sens, proposer une élucidation en <u>français</u> des termes et expressions suivants :

4   'the comforting power of the D-day myth'
9   'little Englanders'
24   'Churchillians'

NB Composer la question 3 sur une feuille séparée

3. Proposer une traduction vers le français du segment suivant :

16-23 "*And lest we forget … of a large and unified Germany.*"

70 years after D-day, Britain's political class has lost its nerve about Europe

The two world wars led to greater equality and Europhilia in Britain, but we're now moving firmly in the opposite direction

In the days ahead we can confidently expect a burst of fervour around the 70th anniversary of the D-day landings. But this will sit oddly with two other tendencies of the moment: First World War mania and the wave of Europhobia. By contrast with the comforting power of the D-day myth, we still do not know what to do with 1914.
5 We are even less clear about our current position in the world, awash as we are with anti-Europeanism.

History is as much a matter of forgetting as remembering. In the current moment, it has become too easy to see the two world wars as wars of Britishers against Europe. The inconvenient truth about D-day for today's little Englanders is that fighting and
10 winning the Second World War was a horribly cosmopolitan business. Yugoslavs, Greeks, Poles, Czechs, Danes, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians and French mixed and mingled, along with cohorts from all over the empire. Added to which the entire country was overrun by Yanks. For this multinational alliance, securing the UK's independence was not a goal in itself. It was a launching pad for a wider campaign to
15 liberate the continent and to build a better Europe.

And lest we forget, this had also been the basic rationale for Britain's even more costly European engagement in the First World War. Amid the contention about the July crisis in 1914 and the mists of emotion concerning the Somme and the trenches, one can lose sight of the fact that Britain's war aims in the First World War were an
20 admittedly self-interested blend of grand strategy and international liberalism: restoring Belgium, building a law-bound system for Europe which could square the security of France, Italy, Russia and a host of newly independent states in central and eastern Europe with the existence of a large and unified Germany.

As far as the Churchillians were concerned, the continuities between 1914 and 1944
25 were direct. In 1944, British troops returned to where they had fought in 1914-18 and 1940 alongside the French. Churchill's sense of entanglement with France was so acute that in June 1940 he agreed with his cabinet to propose a Franco-British union. On the American side too, the sense of D-day as the culmination of a generational crusade was palpable. The commanders of the GIs who were struggling ashore at
30 Omaha and Utah beaches had first set foot in France in 1917 and 1918.

Of course, not everyone agreed with this legitimising assertion of continuity. One of the truly remarkable things about Churchill's war government in 1940 was that it included three first world war-era conscientious objectors. Like many others in 1914,

they had refused the moral case for the First World War. They did not want to see
Britain line up behind resentful and aggressive France and autocratic tsarism. There
were powerful strands of Europhobic isolationism among the British left who
opposed the Great War.

The Second World War, on the other hand, retains its place in the popular
imagination as the people's war. The crusade to liberate Europe in 1944 carried the
Beveridge report and Keynes's promise of full employment on it banners. By contrast,
what is Europe today? Well, as we lazily let it be said over and over again, it is a top-
down project of the metropolitan elite, easy meat for the populists.

One should not overdramatise. The impending decision on Britain's future in Europe
is fateful but it is not as momentous as that taken in August 1914. On the longest day,
70 years ago, as the invasion armada bobbed around in the Channel, the future of the
world was at stake. But the juxtaposition nevertheless casts depressing light on our
current condition. The tensions unleashed within British society by the era of total
war between 1914 and 1945 set the stage for a dramatic shift towards greater equality
and inclusion. Right now we are heading in another direction altogether.

When the political class has lost its nerve to the point where populists' fears about
Romanian immigrants can seriously menace our position at the heart of Europe, we
are further away from D-day than the 70th anniversary suggests.

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